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IS REGULATION GOOD FOR YOU? 
 
ROBERT W. HAHN AND ROHIT MALIK* 
Will all federal regulations soon pass a benefit-cost test? If the OMB’s 2003 
report is any indicator, the answer may be yes–at least for some categories of 
regulations. Applying the midpoint of OMB’s estimates for quantified costs and 
benefits of agency rules, we find that 100 percent of regulations studied would pass a 
benefit-cost test for several agencies, and about 80 percent would pass for all 
agencies considered. Moreover, these regulations would confer at least $100 billion 
annually in net benefits, again using OMB’s numbers. Sound too good to be true? 
That’s probably because it is. 
We argue that OMB’s numbers are plausible, given the methodology that OMB 
uses. Whether they are reasonable is less clear. Some work by economists on related 
sets of regulations suggests that the percentage could be lower. A survey of experts in 
the field also casts doubt on the estimates of the number of regulations that would 
pass a benefit-cost test derived from OMB’s report. The experts also suggest, in line 
with academic research, that there is considerable room for improvement in 
regulations that pass a benefit-cost test. We conclude with several suggestions for 
improving the regulatory process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently issued its 
sixth report on the costs and benefits of regulation. Normally not for 
prime time, this report made the front page of the Washington Post.
1 
The punch line was that the benefits of clean air regulations “during 
the past decade were five to seven times greater in economic terms 
than were the costs of complying with the rules.”
2 
 
* Mr. Hahn is Executive Director of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies. Mr. Malik is a researcher at the Joint Center. The authors would like to thank 
Maureen Cropper, John Graham, Alan Krupnick, Robert Litan, Randall Lutter, John 
Morrall, Cass Sunstein, Scott Wallsten, and Jonathan Wiener for helpful comments and 
Jordan Connors for excellent research assistance. We are solely responsible for the views 
expressed in this paper. 
1. Eric Pianin, Study Finds Net Gains from Pollution Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 
2003, at A1. 
2. Id. 894  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
Will almost all federal regulations soon pass a benefit-cost test? If 
the OMB’s 2003 report
3 is any indicator, the answer may be yes. 
Using OMB’s numbers, we find that 100% of regulations already pass 
a benefit-cost test for several agencies.
4 Furthermore, the aggregate 
net benefits of regulation could be substantial. For example, the OMB 
2003 Report estimates that for the ten year period from October 1, 
1992, to September 30, 2002, the estimated total annual quantified 
benefits for major federal rules were between $146 billion and $230 
billion, and the total annual quantified costs ranged from $36 billion 
to $42 billion.
5 That yields a minimum of over $100 billion annually 
in aggregate net benefits. 
In this paper, we examine the OMB’s numbers in detail to assess 
their plausibility and implications. Part II summarizes data on the 
fraction of regulations that pass a benefit-cost test, using OMB’s data 
as a starting point. Part III examines whether OMB’s numbers are 
reasonable. We conclude that OMB’s numbers are plausible, given 
the methodology that OMB uses. Whether they are reasonable is less 
clear. My suspicion is that they are not, and we present some evidence 
and new survey research that supports this view. Part IV considers 
whether regulations and regulatory analysis are getting better or 
worse with time. Some evidence suggests that there is no obvious 
trend—either in the fraction of regulations passing a benefit-cost test 
or the quality of regulatory analysis.
6 But a new survey suggests that 
experts think regulations may be getting worse over time, at least as 
measured by the fraction likely to pass a benefit-cost test over the last 
two decades.
7 Finally, Part V summarizes my findings and makes 
several suggestions for improving the regulatory process. 
II. HOW MANY REGULATIONS PASS A BENEFIT-COST TEST? 
Before asking how many regulations pass a benefit-cost test, a 
word is needed about the nature of the test. We will use a test that 
 
3. OFFICE OF INFO.  &  REGULATORY  AFFAIRS,  OFFICE OF MGMT.  &  BUDGET, 
INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, 
AND  TRIBAL  ENTITIES  (2003)  [hereinafter  OMB  2003  REPORT],  available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf. 
4. The Department of Education, the Department of Energy, and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development were all found to have 100% of their regulations pass 
benefit-cost tests between 1992 and 2002. See  infra tbl. 1 for the percentages by agency. 
5. See OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 7.  Estimates of costs and benefits are in 
2001 dollars. 
6. See infra fig.1. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39 for a discussion of the survey questions. No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 895 
focuses on quantifiable benefits and costs in the interest of simplicity. 
It is not because we think unquantifiable benefits and costs are 
unimportant in making decisions, but rather because we do not have a 
simple way to address them here. 
OMB basically takes the agency’s analyses of the expected 
economic impacts of regulation as given and monetizes benefits 
where it can.
8 For example, if the agency computes the tons of 
pollution reduced or the number of lives saved, OMB will monetize 
those numbers. Further, OMB only counts regulations for which a 
substantial portion of costs and benefits was quantified and monetized 
by the agency or, in some cases, monetized by OMB.
9 This is 
important because there are many regulations for which agencies do 
not quantify any benefits.
10 The question naturally arises as to 
whether there are really benefits to those regulations. In addition, 
OMB does not  revisit any of the assumptions or numbers in the 
agency’s analyses. Whatever the agency says is gospel for purposes 
of OMB’s analysis. 
 
8. See OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (“All of the estimates presented . . . are 
based on agency information or transparent modifications of agency information 
performed by OMB.”).  The transparent modifications consist of annualizing agency 
numbers, converting to different year dollars, and monetizing pollution reductions in a few 
instances where the agency does not monetize them. See id. at app. A.  
9. OMB should not always omit regulations for which the agency does not estimate 
benefits or costs.  Consider the EPA regulation of Petroleum Refining Process Waste 
reviewed between April, 1998 and March, 1999. The EPA reported zero benefits for this 
program, while reporting costs of $30 million per year. However, the EPA noted that 
“recovered oil benefits were identified and netted out of the cost estimate.” See Report to 
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 7198, 7219 tbl. 6 
(Feb. 11, 2000) [hereinafter OMB 2000 REPORT].  Moreover, agency omissions of benefit 
or cost estimates are not always justifiable: 
[T]he agency has been operating under a restriction on the use of appropriations 
for the last six fiscal years. The restriction has prevented the agency from 
gathering and analyzing data relating to fuel economy capabilities and the costs 
and benefits of improving the level of fuel economy.  Particularly since that 
restriction was lifted only on December 18, 2001, the agency has been unable to 
prepare a separate economic analysis for this rulemaking. The agency notes, 
however, that the standard it is setting for the 2004 model year will not make it 
necessary for the manufacturers with a substantial share of the market to change 
their product plans. 
OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 tbl. 4 (regarding cost-benefit measurement of the 
“Light Truck Average Fuel Economy Standard, Model Year 2004,” 67 Fed. Reg. 16,052 
16,059). 
10. Regulations with costs that are not quantified refer to the 34 regulations included in 
the OMB 2003 REPORT, at 7 tbl. 2. These regulations have “not estimated” under benefits. 
For a complete list of those regulations and their estimated benefits and costs, see OMB 
2003 REPORT, at 12 tbl. 4, app. A;  see also Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,025-27 tbl. 7 (Mar. 28, 2002) 
[hereinafter OMB 2002 REPORT]; OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 9, at tbls. 7, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 16.   896  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
One reason OMB may take the agency numbers as given is that it 
has already reviewed the benefit and cost numbers as part of the 
regulatory review process. During that review process, OMB can ask 
the agency to make changes and use different assumptions at both the 
proposed and final stages during both informal and formal reviews. 
Even though OMB can provide such input, this process is a 
negotiation. And OMB has very limited resources to review these 
regulations. Thus, while OMB has input, it does not provide a detailed 
review of many aspects of these regulations. OMB neither does its 
own analysis from scratch because of resource limitations, nor does it 
effectively enforce its own regulatory guidelines.
11 Thus, it is not 
clear the extent to which OMB technocrats would actually approve of 
the agencies’ analyses if they were in a more academic environment. 
We speculate that the reason that OMB takes the agency numbers as 
given is because it would be politically difficult for an Administration 
to deal with two sets of benefit-cost numbers—one from the 
regulatory agency and a second from OMB. 
Interestingly, OMB reports on the aggregate net benefits of 
regulation, but it does not report on the number of regulations that are 
likely to pass a benefit-cost test by category. We believe information 
on the number of regulations that could pass a benefit-cost test is 
potentially useful to decision makers. If a large fraction of regulations 
failed a benefit-cost test in particular categories, there might be more 
need for oversight.
12 Of course, if the oversight process resulted in 
substantial improvements in net benefits, then it could still be quite 
useful.




11. See ROBERT W. HAHN & PATRICK DUDLEY, HOW WELL DOES THE GOVERNMENT 
DO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS? 9-14 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Working Paper 04-01, 2004) (arguing that the compliance with OMB guidelines is low, 
citing inconsistent comparison of costs and benefits, a failure to evaluate alternatives 
which might yield higher net benefits, insufficient clarity of presentation, and a failure to 
clearly state analytical assumptions), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/ 
authorpdfs/page.php?id=317.  
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION (1993). 
13. In some cases, statutes may require a particular regulation, independent of whether 
it passes a benefit-cost test. For example, the Clean Air Act requires that the 
Environmental Protection Agency set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for a 
variety of air pollutants including ozone, but it allows some flexibility regarding 
implementation. Although regulations setting ozone standards have failed benefit-cost 
analyses, see OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 9, at 7239-40 tbl. 13, the legislative mandate 
does not eliminate the need for oversight.  Further analysis could still help develop a more 
cost-effective regulation. 
14. See, e.g., SCOTT  FARROW,  IMPROVING  REGULATORY  PERFORMANCE:  DOES No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 897 
Some insight into the number of regulations that pass a benefit-cost 
test using OMB’s numbers is shown in Table 1. The table presents 
various estimates of benefits and costs using the low and high 
endpoints for benefits and costs along with the midpoint.
15 The range 
of regulations that pass a benefit-cost test appears to be between 60% 
and 90%, depending on one’s assumptions.
16 Furthermore, some 
agencies have perfect batting averages despite some controversial 
regulations. The Department of Energy, for example, has several 
regulations requiring energy efficiency standards that supposedly pass 
muster.
17 The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), 
similarly, has estimated benefits that exceed costs for all rules, 
including privacy standards for health records—a regulation that has 
been quite controversial in the medical community.
18 The Department 
of Education and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) also have perfect records, but have finalized only a few 
major regulations.
19 
Recall that OMB’s analysis does not include regulations with 
                                                                                                                              
EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  OVERSIGHT  MATTER? 18-23 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper, 2001) (arguing that although Executive Officer 
oversight may result in rejecting some inefficient regulations, these rejections have not 
been strongly correlated with increasing cost-per-life-saved, and such oversight has no 
“efficiency improving impact” on regulations from the time of their proposal to their 
finalization or on the cost effectiveness of regulations that are implemented), available at 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=123; Christopher C. DeMuth 
& Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075, 1082-88 (1986) (arguing that Executive Office oversight is generally desirable, 
especially for its ability to prompt agencies to ask “hard questions” before committing to a 
particular regulatory approach).  Others, like John F. Morrall III, would argue that the 
reason regulations have improved is due in part to OMB oversight. See JOHN F. MORRALL 
III, SAVING LIVES: A REVIEW OF THE RECORD 15-16 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 03-6, 2003) (noting that the absence of a positive time 
trend “may indicate that the agencies and OMB have had some success.”), available at 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=275. 
15. There is some debate about the use of point estimates to approximate the net 
benefits of regulations due to the large amount of uncertainty inherent in predicting costs 
and benefits. See David M. Hassenzahl, The Effect of Uncertainty on Cost-Effectiveness 
Estimation, 7 J. Risk Res. (forthcoming 2004) (analyzing the importance of including 
information about uncertainty in regulatory decisions). In general, it is useful to consider 
uncertainties in key parameters. Unfortunately, regulatory impact analyses do not provide 
such information in a systematic fashion. In the absence of such information, we think 
point and mid-point estimates can provide some useful insights. 
16. See infra tbl. 1. 
17. For examples, see, e.g., OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 91 tbl. 19; OMB 2000 
REPORT,  supra note 9, at 7239-40 tbl. 13. Energy Efficiency Standards for Air 
Conditioners is one such example 
18. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 52-54 (2001). 
19. See OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 99 tbl. 20; OMB 2002 REPORT, supra note 
10, at 15042 tbl. 14; OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 9, at 7212.  See also infra tbl. 1 
(reflecting the number of regulations finalized over the time period 1992-2002 by the n 
values in table 1). 898  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
benefits that were not estimated. In order to measure the extent of the 
bias caused by the omission of these regulations, we calculated the 
number of regulations that would pass a benefit-cost test for each 
agency if these regulations were included in the totals. There were a 
total of thirty-four more regulations to consider that were included in 
the OMB 2003 Report as major regulations, but excluded from their 
totals because the benefits or costs were not estimated.
20 
We assign zero benefits to these regulations for lack of a better 
assumption. Some would argue that zero is a lower bound and can 
lead to misleading results. We would argue that this is a matter of 
interpretation. For example, if a regulation had some quantified costs, 
and benefits were assigned a zero value, then quantifiable net benefits 
would be negative, and the regulation would not pass a benefit-cost 
test based on quantifiable net benefits. But the regulation could still 
pass a more broadly defined benefit-cost test if non-quantifiable 
benefits were included in the final decision. 
Homeland security regulations provide a good example. So far, it 
has been very difficult to quantify the benefits of those regulations. At 
the same time, we would argue that it is useful to put pressure on the 
agency to try to quantify the benefits of those regulations to the extent 
feasible to avoid wasteful social expenditures. 
Note that if some costs and all benefits are left out of the 
calculation, the direction of bias in the net benefits estimate is 
unclear. That is, the estimate could be high or low relative to some 
objective estimate of net benefits. This is so precisely because we do 
not know how the unquantified costs and the unquantified benefits 
compare without further information. 
In short, we think it is not unreasonable to assign a zero dollar 
value to unquantified benefit and cost categories for three reasons. 
First, it would provide regulatory agencies with an incentive to 
provide more information on quantifiable benefits and costs. Second, 
any other assumption seems totally arbitrary since we do not have 
information on the actual non-quantified benefits and costs.
21 Third, 
 
20. See OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 tbl.4. 
21. If one were doing a more in-depth study of particular regulations, it might be 
possible to obtain some quantifiable estimates using expert judgment or some other 
method. But this is precisely what the agencies should be doing. See KENNETH J. ARROW 
ET AL.,  AM.  ENTER.  INST. ET AL.,  BENEFIT-COST  ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, 
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION 4-8 (1996) (arguing that benefits and costs should be 
quantified wherever possible; agencies should be encouraged to use economic analysis to 
help set regulatory priorities, and such analyses should be subject to peer review both 
inside and outside government), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/ No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 899 
the measure of quantifiable net benefits should be used in conjunction 
with non-quantifiable benefits and costs to reach a decision. Exactly 
how is a matter of some debate. 
In quantitative terms, assigning zero benefits to regulations where 
the agency did not estimate benefits decreases the fraction of 
regulations that pass from 80% to 57% using midpoint estimates.
22 
The totals for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) are affected the most. The percentage of 
regulations that pass a benefit-cost test at the midpoint estimate for 
the DOT drops from 42% to 24%, for the EPA it drops from 83% to 
67%, and for the USDA the percentage drops from 80% to 31%.
23 
Interestingly, these numbers are similar to numbers we derive 
independently.
24 
III. ARE THE OMB NUMBERS REASONABLE? 
There are two questions we address. First, are the OMB results 
plausible, given its methodology and assumptions? And second, are 
the OMB results reasonable, i.e., are they good estimates of the likely 
net benefits of regulation? 
To examine the issue of whether the numbers are plausible, we 
consider twenty-one regulations that overlap with an analysis that 
Hahn authored.
25 Table 2 compares the results of Hahn’s analysis 
with OMB’s results.
26 
While the two methods for assessing benefits and costs differ in 
terms of valuing both benefits and costs, they both take the agency 
analyses as the basic point of departure.
27 Thus, they provide a crude 
                                                                                                                              
page.php?id=203. 
22. See infra tbl. 1. When zero benefit regulations were not included, we determined a 
pass rate by dividing 68, the number of regulations that passed a benefit-cost test, by 85, 
the number of regulations considered. Adding 34 to the denominator reduces the overall 
pass rate to 57%. 
23. These calculations were performed by adding 9 zero benefit regulations to the 
denominator for the DOT, 9 for EPA, and 8 for the USDA.   
24. See R OBERT  W.  HAHN,  AEI-BROOKINGS  JOINT  CENTER FOR REG.  STUD., 
REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 58 tbl. 3-9 (2000) (suggesting 
that less than half of final regulations appear to pass a strict benefit-cost test), available at 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=111. 
25. See id. 
26. See infra tbl. 2. 
27. For Hahn’s methodology for assessing benefits and costs of regulation, see HAHN, 
supra note 24, at 38-41.  For OMB’s methodology, see OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, 
at app. A.  There are four main differences between Hahn’s method and OMB’s. First, 
while OMB took agency discount rates and values of statistical life as given, Hahn 
introduced a common discount rate and value of life.  Hahn’s real discount rate for the 900  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
check on the plausibility of OMB’s results. The table reveals that 
OMB finds that sixteen of twenty-one regulations pass a benefit-cost 
test, and we find that fourteen of twenty-one regulations pass a 
benefit-cost test. For the two regulations on which we differ, we have 
similar estimates of benefits and costs; for one regulation, Oil and Gas 
Extraction, it just barely fails using my estimates, and the discrepancy 
between the numbers on the other regulation, Onboard Diagnostics, 
results from different valuations of the benefits of preventing certain 
pollution emissions. Thus, two somewhat different methodologies 
arrive at similar findings about which regulations are likely to pass a 
benefit-cost test. This leads me to the conclusion that the OMB 
numbers are plausible, given the methodology that the agency 
employed. 
We have established that the OMB numbers are plausible, but do 
they really make sense? To determine this, we suggest that selected 
economists take a random sample of the regulations OMB addressed 
and compare their estimates of each program’s expected net benefits 
with OMB’s estimates.
28 This approach could be done in principle, 
but has not been done in practice. 
For now, we note that there are a number of regulations about 
which economists would disagree with the OMB 2003 report. 
Examples include energy efficiency standards, setting limits on 
arsenic and radon in drinking water, the cleanup of lead in soil at 
hazardous waste sites, and corporate average fuel economy 
standards.
29 
There is no systematic analysis of the issue of regulations passing a 
benefit-cost test for the regulations considered here, but there are two 
analyses that are relevant, if not definitive. One by Morrall examines 
                                                                                                                              
base case is 5 percent, with 3 percent and 7 percent used in the sensitivity analyses, and 
value of life for the base case is $5 million, with $3 million and $7 million used in the 
sensitivity analyses. Second, OMB’s pollution values were also different from Hahn’s.  
For Hahn’s pollution values, see HAHN, supra note 24, at 40 tbl. 3-3, and for OMB’s 
pollution values, see OMB  2003  REPORT,  supra note 3, at 91 tbl. 19.  Third, Hahn 
annualized estimates of costs and benefits for each regulation using 1995 dollars, whereas 
OMB annualized estimates using 2001 dollars in its 2003 Report.  Finally, Hahn and OMB 
also had different assumptions for latency periods and willingness-to-pay values for 
reducing nonfatal risks of injury and disease.    
28. Ideally, one would want to know the actual economic impact of the regulation after 
it is implemented, but this is not known at the time the regulation is passed. As OMB has 
noted, the issue of retrospective analysis of regulations deserves more attention. For an 
insightful discussion of the retrospective anlysis of regulation, see Winston Harrington et 
al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 
298 (2000). 
29. See, e.g., representative papers under “Regulatory Reform/Benefit-Cost Analysis,” 
at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/. No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 901 
the cost-effectiveness of seventy-six regulatory actions from 1967 to 
2001.
30 If we assume that Morrall’s numbers are a reasonable proxy 
for the costs and benefits of a particular regulation,
31 and assume that 
the value of a statistical life (“VSL”) is $3 million, then 46% of 
Morrall’s regulations would pass a benefit-cost test.
32 If the VSL 
equals $7 million, then 58 % of Morrall’s regulations would pass.
33 
Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi find similar results.
34 They concentrate on 
regulations aimed at saving lives by restricting their sample to 
regulations where mortality reductions account for at least 90% of 
total benefits, according to agency estimates.
35 Using this smaller 
number of regulations, they find that just ten of twenty-four rules 
(42%) pass a benefit-cost test.
36 
A survey conducted by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center provides 
 
30. See MORRALL, supra note 14. 
31. See id. at 7-8. Where possible, Morrall tries to isolate the costs and estimated impact 
on health of different regulations to derive his measure of cost effectiveness for those 
regulations. Cost effectiveness in this context is defined as the discounted present value of 
costs divided by the discounted present value of lives saved. To derive this measure of 
cost-effectiveness, Morrall first estimates the monetized non-health benefits when that 
number is available or can be derived. He then subtracts that number from the estimated 
total costs of the regulation to get an estimate of the costs of the regulation associated with 
improving health. Note that for Morrall’s approach to provide a reasonable measure of 
cost effectiveness as defined here, the monetized non-health benefits would need to 
approximate the monetized non-health costs. Additionally, the costs of achieving health 
benefits and non-health benefits would need to be separable. For example, suppose a 
benefit of the regulation was that it would reduce pollution by one ton and the monetary 
non-health benefits associated with that reduction (e.g., due to increased visibility) were 
$1000. Then, Morrall is implicitly assuming that the monetary non-health costs were 
$1000 and that these costs could be separated from the health costs that would need to be 
made to achieve the regulation’s objectives. In many situations, the costs may not be 
separable, so this method could be problematic—even if the incremental or average non-
health benefits were equal to the incremental or average non-health costs, which may often 
not be true. Unfortunately, there is no simple adjustment that will solve this problem, 
unless more information is known about the precise nature of the cost function. To some 
extent, Morrall addresses these measurement issues by focusing on regulations that 
primarily offer health benefits. 
32.  VSL is assumed to be in 2002 dollars to match the other figures in the study. From 
1985-2000 various government agencies calculated the VSL to be anywhere between 
$1.04 million and $6.55 million (in 2002 dollars). For specific agency VSL values, see W. 
KIP  VISCUSI  &  JOSEPH  E.  ALDY,  THE  VALUE OF A STATISTICAL  LIFE:  A  CRITICAL 
REVIEW OF MARKET ESTIMATES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, tbl. 12 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9487, Feb. 2003) (reviewing the VSL literature), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9487.pdf. $3 million corresponds with the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s 1996 estimate. 
33. Morrall uses a VSL of $7 million for the purpose of his paper. See MORRALL, supra 
note 14, at 15. 
34. See ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 
(2000), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=106.. 
35. Id. at 15. 
36. Id. at 21 fig. 3-2. 902  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
another check on OMB’s numbers. We surveyed a group of leading 
regulatory economists, Joint Center fellows, Joint Center Board 
members, former OIRA heads and deputy directors. These experts 
were selected because they have a deep knowledge of the federal 
regulatory process, and were fairly evenly distributed in terms of their 
political affiliation. 
The survey included the following questions for the period 1993-
2002: 
Consider major environmental, health and safety regulations 
implemented between 1993 and 2002. If you were doing the 
analysis, approximately what percentage of those regulations do 
you think would have passed a benefit-cost test based on your 
assessment of: 
a. Only benefits and costs that can be quantified? 
__% (fill in) 
b. For those regulations that you think pass a comprehensive 
benefit-cost test, by what percentage do you estimate net benefits 
would increase if those regulations had been designed optimally? 
___% (fill in) 
The same questions were asked for the period covering the 
preceding decade. The results are summarized below.
37 
The experts’ mean estimate of 36% for the period 1993-2002 is a 
far cry from OMB’s estimate of 80% of regulations passing a benefit-
cost test between 1992 and 2002. Moreover, the experts believe that 
less than half of regulations would pass a benefit-cost test in both 
periods.
38 Finally, the experts generally believe that regulations 
became worse over time. The mean estimate of regulations passing a 
benefit-cost test decreased from 44% in the years 1983-1992 to 36% 
in the years 1993-2002.
39 
IV. ARE REGULATIONS AND ANALYSIS IMPROVING? 
First, we examine whether regulations are improving, according to 
OMB’s and the Joint Center’s calculations. To address this issue, we 
consider a time series that combines OMB’s data with some earlier 
data that we collected.
40 Recall that these analyses rely heavily on the 
 
37. See infra tbl. 3. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. The data came from Robert W. Hahn, Reviving Regulatory Reform, supra note 24. No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 903 
government’s own analyses. Because the numbers are not directly 
comparable, we consider the percentage of regulations that pass in a 
given year. One such time series is shown in Figure 1. 
My results suggest that, contrary to the estimates of the survey 
respondents, there is no obvious time trend in the fraction of 
regulations passing a benefit-cost test.
41 
Second, we examine how the cost-effectiveness of regulations 
changes over time. Using Opportunity Costs per Statistical Life Saved 
(OCSLS), a measure for cost effectiveness, there is no evidence of a 
time trend in the health and safety regulations based on the data from 
Morrall’s 2003 study. However we do find that the cost-effectiveness 
of EPA regulations in Morrall’s study, all related to reducing human 
exposure to carcinogens, declines over time. 
In addition, there is overwhelming support for the view that there is 
substantial room for improvement. Survey respondents think that for 
those regulations that would have passed a benefit-cost test, aggregate 
net benefits could have increased by 93% during the period 1983 to 
1992 and by 85% during the period 1993 to 2002.
42 
Examining the relative cost-effectiveness of regulations reveals a 
clue about how that improvement might be achieved. In Morrall’s 
data, regulations designed to reduce human exposure to toxins are 
significantly less cost-effective than other regulations. The mean 
OCSLS for toxin regulations in Morrall’s study is $5.8 billion—
compared with about $4.2 million for all other health and safety 
regulations.
43 This suggests that reallocating some resources away 
from regulating human exposure to toxins would allow the federal 
government to save more lives at a lower cost.
44 
In addition, there are numerous studies suggesting that there is 
ample room for improvement of individual regulations. Some 
examples of proposals include substituting an energy tax for corporate 
average fuel economy standards,
45 allowing states and municipalities 
                                                                                                                              
Hahn’s data was built on earlier work: a study of ninety-two environmental, health and 
safety regulations from 1990 to mid-1996, and is part of a continuing project to track the 
costs and benefits of federal regulation. For more information about the original study, see 
Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?, in 
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 208  (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
41. See infra tbl. 3. 
42. See infra tbl. 3. 
43. See infra fig. 2. 
44. This is consistent with a finding by Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham.  See 
Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED, supra note 40, at 167. 
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to set their own water standards for arsenic,
46 and allowing parties 
responsible for cleaning up hazardous waste sites to substitute clean 
up of lead dust in nearby residences.
47 
 Finally, consider the question of whether analysis has improved 
over time, specifically across different presidential administrations. 
Hahn and Dudley assess the quality of benefit-cost analyses of fifty-
five regulations from the Reagan, first Bush, and Clinton 
administrations and conclude that there is no clear trend in the quality 
of benefit-cost analysis across administrations.
48 Furthermore, they 
find that over 70% of the fifty-five analyses during all three 
administrations fail to quantify net benefits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper asked whether there is evidence that regulation is good 
for you. The answer, of course, is that some regulations make 
economic sense and others do not. In the aggregate, social regulation 
may be good for you, but there are also regulations that are likely to 
fail a benefit-cost test. 
We suggest that the OMB numbers are plausible, using their 
methods and assumptions. Whether they are reasonable is less clear. 
If one believed that OMB regulatory oversight was effective or that 
regulatory agencies actually cared about the net benefits of 
                                                                                                                              
REG. STUD., DO REGULATIONS REQUIRING LIGHT TRUCKS TO BE MORE FUEL EFFICIENT 
MAKE ECONOMIC SENSE? AN EVALUATION OF NHTSA’S PROPOSED STANDARDS (2003), 
available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=244. Lutter and 
Kravitz also take issue with the failure of NHTSA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis to 
consider the unintended consequences of increased fuel economy—namely that because 
driving will take less fuel to travel a given distance, consumers will drive more and 
exacerbate driving-related externalities such as traffic, accidents, and pollution.  Id.. at 23. 
46. See JASON BURNETT & ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR 
REG. STUD., EPA’S ARSENIC RULE: THE BENEFITS OF THE STANDARD DO NOT JUSTIFY 
THE COSTS (2001) (arguing that the EPA’s arsenic rule is unlikely to pass a benefit-cost 
test),  available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=122.   
Burnett and Hahn also explore the option of targeting specific water systems and find that 
this strategy might improve the cost effectiveness of the rule, but not enough to generate 
net benefits.  Id. at 10.  The EPA presents a more optimistic view. See National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source 
Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001). See CASS SUNSTEIN, AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REG. STUD., THE ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC 22-37 (2001), 
available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=153, for a 
review and synthesis of these studies. 
47. See RANDALL LUTTER & ELIZABETH MADER, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR 
REG. STUD., LITIGATING LEAD-BASED PAINT STANDARDS: IS IT A SOLUTION? 22 (2001), 
available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=127. The 
authors recommend policies to regulate lead that would both reduce costs and improve 
children’s health. 
48. See HAHN & DUDLEY, supra note 11. No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 905 
regulations, then the results would not be surprising. If, on the other 
hand, one thought that agencies tended to focus on their mission, as 
Justice Breyer does,
49 and that OMB has very limited power to 
change regulations, then the numbers do appear to be on the rosy side. 
Ideally, we would want a scientific study of the issue that provided an 
independent assessment using a random sample of regulations.
50 
Absent that, we must rely on other pieces of evidence. 
Some work by economists on regulations that overlap with OMB’s 
sample suggests that OMB’s numbers could be optimistic.
51 But 
because they are non-random and do not cover the same time period, 
they are suggestive. 
A survey of experts in the field also casts doubt on the estimates of 
the number of regulations that would pass a benefit-cost test derived 
from OMB’s 2003 report.
52 The experts also suggest, in line with 
academic research, that there is considerable room for improvement 
in regulations that pass a benefit-cost test.
53 We also find that there 
does not appear to be a time trend in the fraction of regulations that 
pass a benefit-cost test using each regulatory agency’s numbers; nor 
does their appear to be a trend in the quality of regulatory analysis 
over time.
54 However, experts appear to believe that the fraction of 
federal environmental, health and safety regulations that pass a 
benefit-cost test has declined over time.
55 
The economic analysis by OMB should be complemented by 
findings from scholarly research. A large body of scholarly research 
suggests that many regulations do not pass a benefit-cost test and that 
there is substantial room for improvement. 
So, where does that leave us? 
First, we observe that all numbers should be taken with a grain of 
salt, and numbers that are developed by regulatory agencies 
responsible for promoting specific regulations should be taken with 
 
49. See BREYER, supra note 12. 
50. See Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve 
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. Fall 2003, at 3, 16-20, for 
such an analysis of antitrust policy in certain areas. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Policy 
Watch: Developments in Antitrust Economics, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 1,  181, 191-192 (1999).  
The point is that such analyses can be done. 
51. See, e.g.,  BURNETT & HAHN, supra note 46.  For a different perspective, see Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J., 2255, 2276-90 (2002). But see 
LUTTER & MADER, supra note 47. 
52. See infra tbl. 3. 
53. See id. 
54. See infra fig. 1. 
55. See id. 906  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
many grains. Ideally, an independent assessment of all such 
regulations would be produced by respected academics, but the 
payoffs for doing such work are generally too low even though the 
economic stakes are frequently high. The AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
does some work along those lines, but more is needed to ascertain 
what we are getting in exchange for regulating in different arenas, and 
the extent to which specific regulations could be improved with better 
design. 
Second, it is important that the analysis itself be improved. At a 
minimum, OMB should insist that the agencies provide some 
information on point estimates and ranges for key parameters, such as 
costs and benefits. Procedures need to be put in place to help improve 
the quality of analysis. 
Third, OMB should consider including in its final tally regulations 
where agencies do not estimate benefits or costs. One good reason is 
to motivate agencies to provide benefits and costs where possible. A 
second is that it is inconsistent with their methods to simply exclude 
these regulations from their totals. Their basic method is to take the 
agency numbers as given. If agencies do not assign a number to a 
particular category of benefits or costs, then it is not unreasonable to 
assign it a zero for purposes of calculating quantifiable benefits and 
costs. Perhaps more research can provide insights into the 
characteristics of regulations for which agencies do not estimate 
benefits or costs. 
Fourth, OMB should also consider asking agencies to report 
estimates of the extent to which the proposed regulations fall short of 
maximizing net benefits. According to the survey results and 
empirical research, this shortfall could be substantial.
56 
Fifth, OMB should require that agencies provide more information 
on individual components of regulations. In general a major federal 
regulation frequently consists of bundles of smaller regulations that 
affect different activities. While some of these may pass a benefit-cost 
test, it is quite likely that some do not. For example, in the case of 
arsenic, regulating small rural water systems may have resulted in 
very little health benefit, but was generally quite expensive.
57 It would 
be useful to identify those parts of regulations that don’t pass a 
 
56. See, e.g., LUTTER  &  KRAVITZ,  supra note 45 (arguing that NHTSA's ruling to 
regulate the fuel efficiency of light trucks is seriously flawed); BURNETT & HAHN, supra 
note 46. 
57. See BURNETT & HAHN, supra note 46. No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 907 
benefit-cost test, so policy makers could modify proposals 
accordingly. 
Sixth, OMB should push for funding of comparisons of the 
economic impacts of regulations before and after they are 
implemented. Such retrospective comparisons could provide useful 
hints on how to improve prospective estimates of the impacts of 
regulations. Agencies could also be asked to help with this evaluation 
effort as part of the Government Performance and Results Act.
58 
The generally rosy regulatory scenario painted in the OMB report 
has left many critics on the Right wondering whether the exercise is 
worthwhile. And those on the Left are rejoicing because they think 
that economists have been beaten at their own game. If all or almost 
all regulations pass a benefit-cost test, regulation’s supporters can 
explain why regulation is good for you. 
We prefer to think about the issue of evaluating regulatory benefits 
and costs in a dynamic context. Seven years ago, OMB was asked to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of 
federal regulation.
59 It has made a good-faith effort to do so and has 
come up with some informative reports. If it continues to stick with 
each regulatory agency’s story, and does nothing to clean up the 
agency’s analytical act, then the basic story in its report won’t change. 
If, on the other hand, OMB introduces some changes that either 
improve the information base from agencies, or uses other 
information sources, a very different story is likely. 
So at some point, in one of our wilder dreams—remember, we are 
economists—we can imagine OMB either not taking the agencies’ 
numbers at face value or making each agency really sing for its 
supper. When that will happen, we cannot say, but we can at least 
enjoy the dream. 
 
58. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Pub.L.No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 
285 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) (requiring each agency to submit annual 
performance reports to OMB). 
59. See O FFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997), 
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Table 1 

























100% 100% 100%  100%  100% 
DOE  (n=6)  100% 100% 100%  100%  100% 
DOL  (n=5)  60% 60% 60%  60%  60% 
DOT  (n=12)  42% 50% 42%  50%  67% 




92% 100%  100%  100%  100% 
HUD  (n=3)  100% 100% 100%  100%  100% 




















(n=85)  61% 65% 80%  82%  85% 
 
Source: OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3. 
 No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 909 
Notes: 
 
Education = Department of Education; 
DOE = Department of Energy; 
DOL = Department of Labor; 
DOT = Department of Transportation; 
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency; 
HHS = Department of Health and Human Services; 
HUD = Department of Housing and Urban Development; 
USDA = Department of Agriculture. 
 
a Regulations were found to have passed a cost-benefit test for a given 
scenario only when estimated benefits exceeded estimated costs for 
that scenario. 
 
b  Twenty-three separate food labeling regulations from HHS were 
combined into one regulation for the purpose of this table. That 
regulation passed a benefit-cost test for all scenarios. 910  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
 Table 2 
 










Department of Labor    
Confined Spaces     Yes
b Yes 
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos  No  No 
Department of Transportation    
Vessel Response Plans  No  No 
Double-Hull Standards  No  No 
Stability Control of Medium and Heavy     
Vehicles During Braking  Yes  Yes 
Environmental Protection Agency     
Oil and Gas Extraction  Yes  No 
Acid Rain Permits  Yes  Yes 
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance  Yes  Yes 
Evaporative Emissions from Light-Duty  
Vehicles Yes  Yes 
Phase II Land Disposal  No  No 
Phase-Out of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals  Yes  Yes 
Reformulated Gasoline  No  No 
Acid Rain NOx Title IV  Yes  Yes 
Hazardous Organic NESHAP  Yes  Yes 
Refueling Emissions from Light-Duty  Yes  Yes 
Non-Road Compression Ignition Engines  Yes  Yes 
Deposit Control Gasoline  Yes  Yes 
Onboard Diagnostics  Yes  No 
Health and Human Services    
Food Labeling (combined analysis of 23  
individual rules)  Yes  Yes 
Housing and Urban Development    
Manufactured Housing Wind Standards  Yes  Yes No. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 911 
  OMB






Department of Agriculture    
Nutrition Labeling of Meat  Yes  Yes 
Total Number Passed  16 14 
Percentage 76%  67% 
 
Sources: OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, at 87-90 tbl. 18; HAHN, 




The final tally of the number of rules passing a benefit cost test 
appears in HAHN,  supra note 24, at 59 tbl. 3-10. The rules listed 
above are included in this tally. 
 
a OMB cost and benefit estimates were calculated by finding the 
midpoint estimate of the reported cost and benefit ranges in the OMB 
2003 Report. 
 
b A regulation is ruled to have passed a benefit-cost test if its 
estimated benefits exceed its estimated costs. 912  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol.  27 
Table 3 
Expert Opinions on Efficiency of Regulations  
and Potential for Improvement 
 
Period 1993-2002  1993-2002  1983-1992  1983-1992 










Mean 36%  85%  44% 93% 
Responses 
 
31 30  31  30 
Standard 
Deviation 
22% 89%  22%  93% 
 
Source: AEI-Brookings Joint Center QuestionnaireNo. 3]  Is Regulation Good for You? 913 
Figure 1 
 
Sources: OMB 2003 REPORT, supra note 3, tbls.18-19; OMB 2002 
REPORT, supra note 10, tbl. 19, OMB 2000 REPORT, supra note 9, 




The sample used for Figure 1 excludes regulations with zero benefits 
and regulations for which the agency did not estimate benefits. If we 
included these regulations, the percentage of regulations passing a 
benefit-cost test would be lower. In the early years, 1984 through 
1986, the sample size is small. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions for these years. We also ran a logit regression to test for 
the existence of a time trend. The results suggested that there is no 
evidence of a time trend in the percentage of regulations that pass a 
benefit-cost test at the 90% level of significance. 
 
Twenty-three food-labeling regulations from HHS are combined into 
one regulation. The number of regulations in the 1980s is lower than 













84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Year Hahn Data
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in the 1990s. Using Hahn’s numbers instead of the OMB’s within the 
overlap period (1992-1995) does not affect the conclusion that there is 
no time trend. 
 
Each year for the OMB study refers to the time period beginning on 
October 1 of the previous year and ending on September 30 of year 
indicated. For instance, the year 1993 refers to major regulations 
reviewed by the OMB between October 1, 1992 and September 30, 
1993. The year 1992 refers to regulations from the Joint Center study 
that were reviewed between January 1 and September 30, 1992 in 








a Morrall focuses on regulations that primarily offer health benefits. 
 
b OCSLS stands for the Opportunity Costs of Statistical Lives Saved. 
OCSLS is derived by dividing the discounted present value of costs 
by the discounted present value of lives saved. 
 
c These are the same categories used by Tengs et al. for grouping 
regulations: toxin control, fatal injury, and medical intervention. See 
Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and 
Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK  ANALYSIS 365, 365-390 (1995). 
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regulations and other regulations. We find that the mean of toxin 
regulations is higher at a 5 percent level of significance. 
Morrall includes health and safety regulations reviewed by the 
OMB between 1967 and 2001 
We use an ordinary least squares regression with the natural 
logarithm of OCSLS as my dependent variable and year as my 
independent variable and find that time does not have a significant 
effect on OCSLS. The finding of no significant time trend is robust, 
even after accounting for several variables including agency and 
regulation type. 